Deliberating about race as a variable in biomedical research by van Niekerk, Anton A
248 April 2011, Vol. 101, No. 4  SAMJ
ORIGINAL ARTICLES
‘Race’ in research ethics is a thoroughly contested social construct 
and concept, and how it is understood and applied is not self-evident 
or clear. Race as a variable in a research protocol needs a rational and 
democratic deliberation, as its admissibility can seldom be settled 
by alleged ‘hard scientific facts’. Hegel proposes deliberation of the 
sciences that produces rational beliefs that ‘are not a matter of turns 
of phrase, allusiveness, half utterances and silences, but consist in the 
unambiguous, determinate and open expression of their meaning 
and significance’.1
A conceptual analysis of deliberation and the intellectual processes 
required when encountering race in research ethics is provided, and 
whether this has constructive implications is investigated.
The literature on deliberation, and deliberative democracy in 
particular, includes the work of Jürgen Habermas,2-4 John Rawls,5 Jon 
Elster,6 James Bohman,7 Amy Gutman and Dennis Thompson,8 Diego 
Gambetta9 and James Fearon.10 Susan Stokes defines deliberation in 
terms of outcomes: ‘the endogenous change of preferences resulting 
from communication’;11 Diego Gambetta’s definition is based on 
aspects of the process: ‘a conversation whereby individuals speak 
and listen sequentially before making a collective decision’;12 Joshua 
Cohen writes of ‘free and public reasoning among equals’;13 and 
James Fearon defines deliberation as a discussion with intrinsically 
good results.14 I prefer Jon Elster’s definition that highlights its 
democratic and deliberative dimensions; it is a form of ‘… collective 
decision making with the participation of all who will be affected by 
the decision or their representatives: this is the democratic part’, and 
refers to ‘… decision making by means of arguments offered by and 
to participants who are committed to the values of rationality and 
impartiality: this is the deliberative part’.15 
The democratic character of truly deliberative processes is striking. 
A deliberation is a conversation in which all participants have an 
equal say and converse about a contested outcome. Participants are 
assumed to be free, equal and rational as outlined by Rawls, with his 
idea of negotiations about justice behind a veil of ignorance,16 and 
Habermas, with his idea of the ideal speech situation as the regulative 
idea guiding the accomplishment of all meaningful speech acts.17 
Participants are assumed to have comparable levels of education, the 
same information and a common commitment to the process.
Secondly, a democratic process of deliberation is public. However, 
this has less to do with its general visibility and accessibility to 
the general public, and more with incorporating the ‘public use of 
reason’ into discourse. ‘Deliberation is public to the extent that these 
[institutional] arrangements permit free and open dialogue among 
citizens, who make informed and reasoned judgments about ways 
to resolve problematic situations’.18 It represents a joint social activity 
and its publicness acknowledges, as claimed by Richard Rorty, the 
priority of process over substance; the ‘priority of democracy over 
philosophy’, i.e. the priority of the ‘Socratic commitment to free 
exchange of views’ over the ‘Platonic commitment to the possibility 
of universal agreement’.19 The ongoing process of a free exchange 
of ideas and insights, and not assuming that every deliberative 
process can and will yield a definitive and universally agreed upon 
conclusion, are important. The public deliberative process means the 
ability and willingness to repeat whatever argument in any form of 
public, even if that does not need to happen. This is less an empirical 
than a logical and regulative characteristic of the process.
Thirdly, deliberation occurs in a group that agrees to the procedural 
assumptions of the process. Therefore the group should be the 
creation of an institutional mechanism such as a research ethics 
committee (REC), which significantly contributes to the discipline 
required to proceed deliberatively. Deliberation is demanding and 
requires courage and perseverance. It does not come naturally, since 
people are naturally inclined to promote self-interest and short-term 
concerns; fortunately, this is diluted by the publicness of the process. 
For a group deliberative conversation to be successful meticulous 
procedural rules are not required, but it relies on co-operation 
implying forfeiting the promotion of own interests and insights. 
Causes of its failure include showing up late at meetings, not paying 
attention to what is said, jumping the queue, all speaking at once, and 
shouting (particularly in the absence of any argument). Fearon states 
that ‘discussion, as a means of revealing private information, can 
be effective only when the number of the group do not understand 
themselves to have widely divergent or conflicting interests’.20 This 
represents a significant challenge when race is the issue.
Elements of the Socratic dialogue (for a comprehensive analysis 
of Socratic dialogue, as distinguished from Sophist debate, see Van 
Niekerk21), largely a one-on-one exercise, can enhance the effect in 
deliberation. The Socratic docta ignorantia represents an attitude, 
not of initially knowing nothing (we all know something when 
entering dialogue), but of acknowledging the mutual partiality, 
fragmentation and fallibility of whatever knowledge we might 
think to have of a matter. This opens us to other insights and to 
learn from our interlocutors. When willing to learn from others we 
realise the limitations of our own views. Gambetta warns against 
the ‘claro’ (the Spanish word for ‘obvious’) culture that easily takes 
hold of partners in deliberation; the disposition to say ‘I knew it 
all along; nothing you say surprises me!’ –  which belittles those 
who express an argument.22 Openness to other views distinguishes 
dialogue from debate: in debates, we wish to persuade and to win 
over to our non-negotiable position; in dialogue, we want to learn 
rather than persuade. It differs from bargaining, in which interests Corresponding author: A A van Niekerk (aavn@sun.ac.za)
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are promoted by threats and promises, or voting, in which views 
are simply aggregated. Deliberation informed by the ideals of 
Socratic dialogue unmasks the risks inherent in others’ positions, or 
welcomes that risks be identified in my views. Ideally it leads to an 
often unforeseen new creative achievement that was not the position 
of anyone at the beginning. The most important Socratic aspect of 
deliberation is that decision-making ought to be the outcome of a 
transformation of views, rather than simply the aggregation (and 
possible misrepresentation) of preferences. The end or telos reached 
will differ from the respective initial insights of each individual in 
the group. It amounts to choosing between available alternatives and 
creating new alternatives.23 Deliberation should spur and actively 
promote the imagination. Its outcome should transform opinion, 
even if that does not transform society, as wished for by Karl Marx.
Deliberation should not necessarily aim at defining a final truth. It 
is more prudent to acknowledge that, at most, deliberation pursues 
a series of progressive settlements, achieved in the light of available 
information and the dialectical engagement of different ideas.
Race and research proposals
Deliberating about race in evaluating research proposals is daunting 
as the spectre of race, prejudice and discrimination is a haunting and 
destructive force in South Africa’s history, from which it cannot be 
divorced.24 The emotions and experiences raised by the phenomenon 
of race should not be underestimated. Antjie Krog25  analyses the 
difficulties of so intensely identifying with people of another race that 
one actually can become one of them: ‘I want to be part of the country 
I was born in. I need to know whether it is possible for somebody 
like me to become like the majority, to become “blacker?” and live 
as a full and at-ease component of the South African psyche … How 
do I “flee” towards black … if I have never cared to know what black 
means … is it possible for a white person like myself, born in Africa, 
raised in a culture with strong Western roots, drenched in a political 
dispensation that said black people were different and therefore 
inferior … to move towards a “blackness” as black South Africans 
themselves understand it?’ She refers to Njabulo Ndebele, who said 
that ‘white people in South Africa have a unique opportunity to 
remove themselves from under the umbrella of the international 
sanctity of the white body and share the vulnerability of the black 
body’.26 Since that requires a better understanding of the vulnerability 
of the black body, she realises that race has to do with more than 
skin colour;27 race is not primarily an appearance but an experience, 
a resistance, the challenge of ‘otherness’ that is not comfortably 
accommodated in the realm of familiar society. Her ‘struggle for 
blackness’ is not necessarily positive. ‘The strangeness is real, [as is] 
the fact that I cannot ever really enter the psyche of somebody else, 
somebody black. The terror and loneliness of that inability is what I 
[nevertheless] don’t want to give up on.’28
Empathy with the dehumanising way in which race was dealt 
with is not simple. In an REC discussion we cannot suddenly shed 
our cultural and societal baggage in racial thinking. However, the 
structured and disciplined context of an REC supports our efforts 
to overcome prejudice and to engage in a conversation where, in 
the hope expressed by Habermas, the only force that prevails will 
be the superior rational argument. Krog refers to John Rawls: ‘He 
says that you don’t have to assume a common moral framework in 
the multicultural and liberal world of today to have stable political 
community. It is better to find a structure that can carry a variety of 
moral frameworks. He says … it is almost impossible for such diverse 
groupings to find a common moral framework, but it is possible to 
design a framework that can survive the tension and renegotiations of 
different frameworks. One can agree through overlapping consensus, 
even if not for the same reasons.’29 The structured setting of the REC 
contributes to the attainment of this possibility.
The democratic nature of deliberation and that equal partners 
participate in it is equally important for considering racial issues 
in REC meetings. Special efforts must be made to accept people’s 
bona fides, despite the fact that this does not come naturally. 
Despite Krog’s existential ruminations, we must accept that the way 
people think is not a function or a consequence of their skin colour. 
Committees should be cautious of discrimination on the basis of skin 
colour denying somebody the ability and opportunity to contribute 
meaningfully, e.g. ‘You are white/black, therefore you don’t know 
what you are talking about’.
We should insist that the democratic basis of deliberation demands 
that any issue, including race, must be fully faced and addressed when 
introduced as a variable in a protocol. Race permeates the social, 
cultural, political and public debate in South Africa. Although we 
know that race often is a social construct, this is difficult to undo.  To 
deal with race, an REC should acknowledge its reality and sensitivity, 
establish as many relevant facts as possible for consideration, suspend 
judgement as long as possible, and at decision-time construct an 
argument that one is willing to repeat in any public context.
Several research articles30-33 deny the relevance of race as a marker 
in biomedical research. Schwartz claims that ‘race is a social construct 
and not a scientific classification’ and quotes a position paper of 
the American Anthropological Association: ‘It has become clear 
that human populations are not unambiguous, clearly demarcated, 
biologically distinct groups … Throughout history whenever different 
groups have come into contact, they have interbred. The continued 
sharing of genetic materials has maintained humankind as a single 
species … Any attempt to establish lines of division among biological 
populations is both arbitrary and subjective.’33 Bloche asserts that race 
is an ‘ill-defined, indeed undefined’ marker in health care research 
and criticises an African American Heart Failure Trial (A-HeFT) that 
included patients who were self-identified as ‘black’.31
RECs must note this literature, but that does not mean that the 
matter may be more complicated and that race could be a significant 
marker in certain studies. A case study ‘Modeling the epidemiologic 
transition: energy expenditure, obesity and diabetes’ (METS), 
that was discussed at a research ethics seminar of the IRENSA 
(International Research Ethics Network of South Africa) programme 
at the University of Cape Town, quoted literature that argues for 
acknowledging the relevance of race in explaining diseases such as 
obesity and diabetes. Multiple sclerosis seems to be confined to white 
people living far from the equator, and cancer of the oesophagus in 
South Africa mostly occurs among black people in the Eastern Cape. 
Undeniable facts must be faced and dealt with in a rigorous scientific 
manner. An open mind must be kept in the REC deliberations, where 
we are to learn and to submit strongly held views to the critical 
scrutiny of others from whom we should be prepared to learn. Race 
is not a straightforward social or biological ‘fact’. Race will always be 
a contested concept which demands, for its legitimate acceptance or 
rejection in health care ethics, an open discussion which is executed 
and governed by the search for the best argument.
If the only force in democratic deliberation is rational argument, 
what counts as rational? Habermas writes: ‘we call someone rational 
not only if he is able to put forward an assertion, and, when criticized, 
to provide grounds for it by pointing to appropriate evidence, but also 
if he is following an established norm and is able, when criticized, 
to justify his action by explicating the given situation in the light 
of legitimate expectations’.34 However, the level of contestation by 
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the notion of race may force an REC to indulge in what Habermas 
calls the ‘discourse’ of reconstructive science.  Bernstein considers 
that this discourse is ‘... the type of elucidation and argumentation in 
which we suspend immediate action and in which participants seek 
to redeem the validity claims that have been challenged. “Discourse” 
is a term of art, a construct, an “ideal type” introduced to highlight 
the type of speech that is relevant for argumentative redemption of 
validity claims.’35 Thus it might sometimes be necessary to reflect on 
our norms and values in deliberations about race to establish that we 
are on the same wavelength, are talking about the same thing, and are 
applying the same criteria when we evaluate arguments.
Conclusion
The REC should demand that the protocol provides a careful 
consideration of race as a factor in the selection of the study group. 
The central issue is whether, in spite of the ‘potential social costs 
associated with linking race or ethnic background with genetics, 
… these potential costs are outweighed by the benefits in terms of 
diagnosis and research’.36 The REC cannot decide the relevance of 
race as variable in a study if this is not clear and persuasive.
It must be established how pivotal a factor race is, compared 
with other factors in the sample or group selection. Is race really 
an inherent characteristic that sample members should share, or is 
it of secondary importance? Is race not possibly, as the case study 
alludes, ‘like the side of the city on which people live … a marker for 
differential experiences and exposures rather than a factor inherent 
to the person’?37
Is race identified as a marker, and have all other possible variables 
been taken in to account? Other possible variables include ‘socio-
economic status, social class, personal or family wealth, environmental 
exposures, insurance status, age, diet and nutrition, health beliefs and 
practices, education level, language spoken, religion, tribal affiliation 
and country of birth’.38 
Are the names assigned to groups acceptable to the groups 
themselves?
Finally, deliberation, especially about a controversial notion such 
as race, is arduous and will probably remain inconclusive. It is too 
much to expect this process to yield definitive truths. We can expect a 
series of (hopefully) progressive settlements that represent provisional 
beacons of insight to draw on in future conversations. Race cannot 
easily be settled and forgotten about in future; it represents tensions 
and contestations that will continue to permeate interpersonal 
contact and social relations in this country. Our challenge is to 
make it manageable and no longer feared or concealed. If continued 
deliberation cannot achieve that, nothing short of violence will. 
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